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Abstract. A public-key cryptosystem based essentially on ideas coming from L systems was 
introduced in (Salomaa nd Welzl, 1983), see also (Salomaa, 1985) and (Salomaa, 1984). The 
system was further investigated in (Baunwall, Bertelsen and Weibel, 1986) and (Koskinen and 
Salomaa, 1985). The purpose of the present paper is to study the system, both from mathematical 
and cryptanalytic point of view. In particular, we investigate cryptanalytic approaches and what 
one can accomplish by preprocessing. We also discuss the desirable properties of the underlying 
DTOL system such as different types of backward eterminism and the role of growth. The system 
is very flexible in many respects, for instance, as regards the plaintext blocksize. 
1. Introduction 
After the seminal paper in public-key cryptography [3], a great variety of public- 
key cryptosystems have been proposed. Undoubtedly the RSA system [5] is the 
most widely tested one. There are also more mathematical studies about RSA than 
about any other public-key cryptosystem. (The ambiguity in this sentence is inten- 
tional: the studies in question are both more mathematical nd greater in number.) 
Public-key cryptosystems are constructed along the following guidelines. 
(i) start with a difficult (intractable) problem P; 
(ii) pick up an easy subproblem P~ of P; P~ should be in low polynomial time; 
(iii) 'shuffle'/)1 in such a way that the resulting problem/'2 'looks like' the original 
problem P; use/)2 as the public encryption key; 
(iv) keep secret he information concerning how P] can be recovered from/)2; 
this information is referred to as the 'trapdoor'; 
(v) a legal user of the system is able to decrypt by solving the easy problem P~; 
others have to solve P2 that at least looks like the intractable P. 
The guidelines (i)-(v) are still on a very abstract level. How the details can be 
filled in decides the quality of the resulting cryptosystem. 
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In cryptosystems such as RSA or knapsack, the underlying problem P is number- 
theoretic. However, in principle, there are no restrictions as regards the area or 
subject matter of the underlying problem P. The theory of formal languages eems 
to be a very suitable area. The cryptosystem introduced in [10] (see also [7, 8]) and 
further studied in [1, 4] is based on language theory or, more specifically, on the 
theory of L systems. 
The purpose of this paper is a further investigation of this cryptosystem. A brief 
description of the contents of the paper follows. 
We begin with a short introduction into the system in Section 2. An important 
aspect of the underlying DTOL system (corresponding to the easy subproblem/)1 
described above) is backward determinism. Various aspects of this notion are 
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses cryptanalytic approaches, in particular 
preprocessing. We investigate what the possibilities are for a cryptanalyst who, 
starting from the publicized T0L system, has found a DTOL system or a simpler 
T0L system that might serve as a basis for the T0L system but still is not the one 
actually used by the cryptosystem designer. 
In some cryptosystems the size of the blocks in the plaintext is fixed by the 
premises and cannot be changed. This is not the case as regards the system under 
study: the plaintext blocksize is very flexible. This will be discussed in Section 5. 
Section 6 deals with the role of the dummy letters in the publicized T0L system, 
and Section 7 with the role of growth in the underlying DTOL system. We finally 
make some comparisons with other public-key cryptosystems based on language 
theory. 
While we try to present matters as much self-contained as possible, the reader 
can consult [6] for additional information about L systems and [7] for additional 
information about language theory and cryptography. 
2. Description of the cryptosystem 
Let ,Y be an alphabet and consider two morphisms/to, hi :,Y*-~ ,Y*, as well as a 
nonempty word w in ,Y*. We say the quadruple G= (,Y, he, h~, w) is backward 
deterministic if the condition 
(1) (W)ioi~... i, = (W)jojl. . . j , , , ,  each i and j in {he, hi}, 
always implies the condition 
(2) io i , . . ,  in =A J,...J,.. 
More specifically, (1) indicates that the two words over ,Y appearing on the two 
sides of the equation are equal, whereas (2) indicates that m = n and the two words 
over the alphabet {he, hi} appearing on the two sides of the equation are equal. 
By the terminology of L systems, the quadruple G = (,Y, he, hi, w) is a DTOL 
system. The condition of backward eterminism eans that the final outcome always 
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determines uniquely the sequence of tables used. An obvious way to obtain backward 
determinism is to include a special etter t in ,Y ('table indicator') with productions 
t->tO, 0->0, 1->1, in ho, 
t->tl ,  0->0, 1->1, in hi. 
Backward deterministic DTOL systems G can be used as classical cryptosystems: 
a sequence of bits/oil . . .  i, is encrypted as the word over ,Y: (w)hbh~l... h~. Then 
O has to be kept secret. Otherwise, there is no differrence between the (legal) 
decryption and the (illegal) cryptanalysis. 
Let us now see how this classical cryptosystem can be changed into a public-key 
one. Intuitively, this means that the DTOL system G is 'hidden' within a T0L system 
H with a much bigger alphabet. A legal recipient of messages can decrypt by using 
the secret rapdoor information about recovering O from H. A cryptanalyst has to 
work with the basically intractable parsing problem of H. 
More specifically, let A be an alphabet of a much greater cardinality that ,Y. 
Typically, Y consists of five letters, whereas A consists of 200 letters. Let g: A* --> ,Y* 
be a morphism mapping every letter to a letter or to the empty word in such a way 
that g-~(a) is nonempty for all letters a of ?. Define two finite substitutions Cro and 
cr~ on A* by letting ¢ri(d) to be a finite nonempty subset of 
g- l (h i (g(d)) )  for all d in A, i= O, 1. 
Intuitively, the morphism g divides the letters of A into descendants of letters of 
,Y and into dummy symbols that are mapped into the empty word ~. 
Finally, choose a word u from g-~(w). The quadruple H = (A, O'o, cry, u) now 
constitutes the public encryption key. The encryption of a sequence ioil . . .  i, of bits 
happens by choosing an arbitrary word from the (finite) set 
(3) o-io. 
The secret trapdoor consists of the items ?, ho, h~, w, and g. In fact, g is the 
essential item because the other items can be determined from g and the public 
encryption key. 
It follows by the definitions that whenever y is a word in the set (3), then 
g(y) = ( w)h~ohi, . . . hi.. 
Thus, the knowledge of the secret rapdoor educes decryption to the easy parsing 
problem of the DTOL system G. 
In the terminology of L systems, H is a TOL system. 
Plaintext can and should be divided into blocks before encryption is begun. The 
blocks may be of variable sizes. The sizes should not be too large. Otherwise, the 
cryptotext will be too long in comparison with the plaintext. In the normal case the 
cryptotext blocks are separated by a boundary marker #.  
Instead of two morphisms and substitutions, the systems G and H might have 
more of them. For instance, if we want to encrypt directly a plaintext given in 
decimal notation, we should use ten morphisms and substitutions. 
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Let us still consider an example. The DTOL system G is determined by w = ab 
and by the two morphisms 
ho: a-* ab, b--> b; 
hl : a--> a, b-> ba. 
Backward determinism follows because the last morphism applied is ho exactly in 
case the word under scan ends with b. (It is also true that the last morphism is ho 
exactly in case the word under scan has the subword bE.) 
Define now A = {cl, c2, c3, c4, c5} and g by 
g(c2) = g( c4) = a, g( cl) = b, g( c3) = g( c~) = e. 
Choose u = CECaCl and define two substitutions tro and 0" 1 by 
0"0:Cl-->C5Cl, C2.-'>C2CaCl, C2.-->c4C5Cl, C3--->c3c5, 
ca--> csca, c4 --> c2clcac5, c5 -> c5c5; 
0"1:Cl-'>ClC2, C1"->CLC4, C2-'> C4, C3-'>C3C5C3, 
Ca ~ c5c5, C4--> C2, C4--> c4, c5--'> C 5 . 
We have completed the definition of the public encryption key H = (A, tro, trl, u). 
3. Different versions of backward determinism and their significance 
Dassow has shown in [2] that it is recursively unsolvable to determine whether 
or not a DTOL system is backward eterministic. We can easily strengthen this result 
to show that even if all the morphisms of DTOL systems are injective, the problem 
is still unsolvable. 
This result is negative more to the cryptanalysis than to the construction of 
cryptosystems of this type. A secret DTOL system does not have to be built by 
choosing an arbitrary DTOL system and then testing its backward eterminism. It
can be built with some special properties to ensure its backward eterminism. The 
following properties, for example, can be used to distinguish whether ho or hi was 
applied in the last step to derive a word: 
(1) the appearance of a certain subword; 
(2) a special prefix or suffix; 
(3) a certain ratio between the numbers of occurrences of different letters. 
The next result gives a helpful consideration for the construction of a backward 
deterministic DTOL system. 
Theorem 3.1. Let G = (?, ho, hi,  w) be a DTOL system. I f  hp, for  some p = 0 or 1, is 
periodical, i.e., there exists a word z ~,Y* such that hp( a) ~ {z}* for  every a ~ ?, then 
G is not backward deterministic. 
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Proof.  Assume hp is periodical. Let q # p and q E {0, 1}. Then we have hp(w) = z z, 
hp(z) = z m, (z)hqhp =z" for some nonnegative integers l, m, n and ze  ,Y*. Hence, 
( w)hphqhphp = (zt)hqht, hp = (z")hp = z ` '''~ 
and 
( w)hphphqhp = ( z')hphqhp = ( ztm)hqhp = z ,mn. 
Then G is not backward eterministic by the fact that 
( w ) hphqhphp = ( w ) hphphqhl, and pqpp # ppqp. [] 
The unsolvability of backward eterminism is negative to the cryptanalysts in the 
sense that even if a cryptanalyst has obtained a DTOL system from the public T0L 
system by some means, he still has no general algorithms to test whether or not his 
DTOL system is backward eterministic. 
However, it is desirable and necessary that our secret DTOL systems are not only 
backward deterministic but also easy to parse. For this purpose, we introduce the 
notion of strong backward eterminism of DTOL systems as follows. 
Definit ion 3.2. A DTOL system G = (,Y, ho, h~, w) is said to be strongly backward 
deterministic if, for any z = (w)hi l . . .  hi, and hk(y)=z, i l , . . . ,  it, k ~ {0, 1}, z, y e ,Y*, 
the following conditions hold: 
(1) k=i t ;  
(2) y=(w)h~,. . ,  hi,_1. 
Intuitively, every word generated by a strongly backward deterministic DTOL 
system has a unique predecessor in ,Y*, and is derived from this predecessor by a 
unique morphism. On the contrary, a word generated by a backward eterministic 
DTOL system may have several predecessors in ,Y* although it has at most one 
predecessor in L(G) (the language generated by G). And different morphisms may 
be used to derive this word from its predecessor. Therefore, in order to determine 
the correct predecessor that is in L(G)  and the morphism used for a given word, 
one may have to trace back many steps or even go back to the axiom. 
In other words, the parsing sequence of a word in a backward eterministic DTOL 
system depends on both the word and the axiom. But the parsing sequence of a 
word in a strongly backward eterministic DTOL system depends on the word itself 
only. The axiom only decides where the parsing should end. 
It is clear that strong backward eterminism i plies backward eterminism, and 
the reverse is not necessarily true. The following example further displays that there 
exist backward eterministic DTOL systems which axe not strongly backward eter- 
ministic. 
Let G = ({a, b}, ho, hi, ab) be a DTOL system,, where 
ho:a-->ab, b-*bb; hl :a-*bb, b-->ab. 
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First we show that G is backward deterministic. Assume the contrary. Then there 
exist two sequences of morphisms hilhi2.., hi, and hi, h~2.., h~, such that 
(ab)hi~hi2. .. hi. = (ab)hj, h~. .. hg, and ili2. . . is #j~j2. . . j t .  
Assume they are the shortest of such sequences, i.e., (ab)hi, hie.., his_, # 
(ab)hi, h~.. .  hi,_,. Since both ho and h~ are injective, is #jr.  Then we know that the 
word (ab)hi~hi~... his_~ is the same as the word (ab)hj, hj~.., hj,_~ except that a and 
b are interchanged. Hence, 
(ab)hi~hi~... hi~_~ {ab, bb}* and (ab)hj, hj2.., hi,_, ~ {ba, aa}*, 
or vice versa. But this is impossible. Therefore, we know the assumption is wrong 
and G must be backward deterministic. G is not strongly backward deterministic 
because, for example, the word bbababab e L(G) has two predecessors baaa and 
abbb such that ( baaa )ho = ( abbb )hl = bbababab. 
Besides, the above example also shows that a DTOL system can still be backward 
deterministic even if 
ho: al ~ 0~1, a2 -> or2 , . . . ,  ak  -> ak ,  
h i  " a l  ~ otis, a2  ~ ot h ,  • • • ,  ak  "* Oti k, 
where (i~, i2 , . . . ,  ik) is a permutation of (1, 2 , . . . ,  k). 
Next, we show that it is decidable whether or not a DTOL system is strongly 
backward deterministic. 
Let h :Z* - ,  Z* be a morphism. We denote by B(h) the set 
{w ~ h(,Y*)lw = h(u) = h(v) for some u, v ~ Z* and u # v}. 
Intuitively, B(h) is the set of all words each of which is the morphic image of at 
least two different words in ,Y*. 
Theorem 3.3. A DTOL system G = (.Y,, ho, hi, w) is strongly backward eterministic f
and only if 
(1) L(G)c~(ho(.Y*)nh~(~,*))=~ and 
(2) L(G)c~B(hi)=~ for i=O, 1. 
Readers can verify that the above conditions (1) and (2) are equivalent o the 
conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 3.2. 
Theorem 3.4. It is decidable whether or not a DTOL system is strongly backward 
deterministic. 
Proof. It follows by the theory of L systems [6] that condition (1) of Theorem 3.3 
is decidable. In the remaining part of the proof, we show that condition (2) is also 
decidable. For this purpose, it suffices to show that B(hi) is regular and constructable 
from hi for i = 0, 1. Since the proofs are the same for both ho and hi, we write h 
instead of hi, i = 0, 1, in the rest of the proof. 
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Let C = h(Z). We inductively define the languages Co, C1, C2,. . .  over ,~ as in 
[9]: 
(1) Co=C; 
(2) Ci+l={WeZ+[yw=xorxw=yforxeC,  yeC i} .  
Note that if Ci = ¢, then Cj = ~1 for all j I> i. Since C is finite and every word in every 
Ci is of length at most equal to the length of the longest word in C, there are finitely 
many distinct C:s. Let Co, C1, . . . ,  C, be all of such distinct nonempty sets. Define 
Si = C* Ci c~ C * for i = l, 2, . . . , n. 
Then we claim that 
The proof of this claim is lengthy and similar to the proof of Sardinas and Patterson's 
algorithm. Interested readers may refer to [9]. 
The backward determinism and strong backward determinism of T0L systems 
can be similarly defined as for DTOL systems. It is not difficult to show that a secret 
backward eterminisitic DTOL system implies backward eterminism of the public 
T0L system. But it is not the case as regards trong backward eterminism. 
A DTOL system G and a T0L system H are as described in the example given 
in Section 2. G is strongly backward eterministic, but H is not by the following 
fact: let y = C4CsCsClC2C3CsC3CsCsC~C2e (u)O'oO'l; then y can be derived from 
either 
x~= C2GGCsGC~ or x2 = C4CsCsC~GCsCsC~,  
i.e., y~o'~(Xl)  and y~o'~(x2). [] 
The third version of backward eterminism is called strict backward eterminism. 
It is stronger than the first version and weaker than the second version. 
Definition 3.5. A backward eterministic DTOL system G = (Z, ho, hi, w) is said to 
be strictly backward deterministic if the condition 
(1) (w)hi~hi2... hi, =(x)hk ,  each h is in {ho, h~},xe,Y* ,  
always implies the condition: 
(2) i, = k= 
The DTOL system given by the first example in this section is backward eterminis- 
tic but not strictly backward deterministic. The next example exhibits a strictly 
backward eterministic DTOL system which is not strongly backward eterministic. 
G = (~, ho, hi,  abc) where ~? = {a, b, c, O, 1} and 
ho : a -* bb, b -* bb, cocO,  0-~0, 1-~1; 
hl : a-* bb, b-~ bb, c-> cl ,  0-~0, 1-*1. 
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G is strictly backward deterministic because whether ho and h~ is used at the last 
step can be uniquely determined by the letter next to c. But, for any word in L(G) 
except the axiom, there are at least two direct predecessors. So, G is not strongly 
backward deterministic. 
The intermediate notion of k-step backward determinism can also be defined, 
that is, k steps of tracing back are needed to perform one step parsing. The strong 
backward determinism is a 0-step backward determinism. 
4. Cryptanalysis 
There are many possible ways to start an attack on a cryptosystem of this type. 
We now discuss three of them. 
The first possible way to attack such a system is to find a morphism f that maps 
the public T0L system into a (hopefully) simpler one so that further attacks become 
easier. Formally, let H = (A, cro, cry, u) be a public T0L system, G = (Z, h0, h~, w) 
the corresponding secret DTOL system and g:A*-.->.Y,* the trapdoor morphism. A 
cryptanalyst tries to break the system by finding g. Instead, he may find a mapping 
f :  A --> A' which is independent of g, and a T0L system H '  = (A', cry, o'~, u') such 
that f (u )  = u' and cr~(f(a)) = {f (a )  I a for any a ~ Z and i = 0, 1. Obviously, 
A' should be smaller than A. In order to decrypt a cryptotext x, the cryptanalyst 
works on f (x )  by using H '  instead of working directly on x by using H. He gets a 
set of decrypted texts 
Oy(x)= {ili2. . . i , , I f (x)~ (u')~r[,~[~... ~,}. 
Although f is totally independent of g, we show in the following that the correct 
plaintext for x is nevertheless in De(x).  Consequently, if the cardinality of D/(x)  
is 1, the only decrypted text is indeed the plaintext. 
Theorem 4.1. Let H, H '  and f be defined as above and u '# e. Let x ~ A + and 
x E (u)crijri~... o'i,.. I f f (x )  ~ e and 
D~(x) = {J1A . . .A  I f (x)  e (u)o'~, cr~ . . . cry.}, 
then i l i2. . ,  i,, ~ Df (x) .  
Proof. Since xe  (u)tri, tr~.. ,  tri~, there exists a sequence xl, x2 , . . . ,  xm such that 
x, xm = x 
Note that x~ ~ e for i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  m. By the definitions of f and ~r~, i = 0, 1, we have 
f (x , )  ~ o'~,(f(u)) , f (x2) ~o'~2(f(x,)),. . .  , f (Xm) = f (x )  ~ O'~,,,(f(xm_,) ). 
Since f (x )  ~ e, we have f(xj)  ~ e fo r j  = 1, 2 , . . . ,  m. So, f (x )  ~ (u')cr~jr~...  cry,, i.e., 
i l l2. . ,  i,n ~ Df (x) .  [] 
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The above observation is certainly helpful to cryptanalysts. An attack of this 
type at least restricts the set of possible plaintexts to a smaller ange. It is possible 
that the resulting H '  happens to be a DTOL system in spite of the fact that f can 
be totally (structurally) different from g. An attack of this type can be very useful 
when a cryptanalyst knows some other information about the plaintext, e.g., he has 
only to choose the right one between two candidates. Several mappings f~, f2 , . . . ,  f~ 
can be jointly used so that a possibly smaller set 
D= Dfl(x) c~Dy2(x)n" "c~Dy,(x) 
is obtained. 
This attacking approach possibly works only for short tests and for the cases 
where it is joined with other efforts. The problems of this approach are the following. 
(1) Even when it works for some text, it does not reveal any information of the 
secret rapdoor mapping g and the DTOL system G. So, it is not likely to work for 
the general case. 
(2) For a text of n bits with blocksize of k bits, even when we could restrict he 
candidates of a plaintext o two for each block, we would still have to choose a 
correct answer out of 2 n/k possibilities. 
The second approach of attacking a cryptosystem of this type is to reduce the 
size of the alphabet by deleting dummy symbols and useless ymbols. 
For a given T0L system H = (A, o'o, o'1, u), define the relation > as follows: 
(1) if aby ~ tri(a), i = 0 or 1, then a > b; 
(2) i fa>band b>c,  thena>c.  
Clearly, if a e A is actually a dummy symbol, then all the symbols in the set 
C(a) = {b[a >* b} are dummy symbols. For a given a e A, we define a morphism 
d such that d(c) = c if c e~ C(a) and d(c) = e otherwise. By applying d, we obtain a 
new TOE system H'=(A',tr'o, tr~,d(u)) where A'=d(A)-{e},  tr~(d(c))= 
{d(a)[a ~ tri(c)} for i=0 ,  1 and ceA'. Again by Da(x) we denote all the possible 
texts decrypted from d (x) according to H',  for a given text x. By applying Theorem 
4.1, we know that we will not loose any correct answer if we delete a set C(a) from 
the alphabet A. But we may get false results from this 'simpler' system. If c is really 
a dummy symbol or a symbol which does not determine the 'path' of a cryptotext 
x, then the resulting 'simpler" system is equivalent to the original one as far as x is 
concerned. 
If E = C(c) satisfies E = C(a) for every a ~ C(c), then E is very likely to be a 
set of dummy symbols. 
The computation of C(a) for a e A is not difficult. However, we have not obtained 
any tractable algorithm to decide whether or not a symbol is a dummy symbol. I f  
c is not a dummy symbol, the system G" generated by deleting C(c) from the 
alphabet may work for some cryptotext but is not likely to work for general cases. 
The third attacking approach we like to mention is the brute force approach. Let 
a T0L system H = (A, tro, o'1, u) be the publicized system. For simplicity, we assume 
that there are 2 k substitutes for each letter in A and each table. We also assume 
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that lu[ = 1 and the growth rate is 2 for every substitution. The cryptanalyst is trying 
to decrypt a cryptotext x of length n as follows. He knows that x was encrypted 
by log2n steps of substitutions from u. He tries all the possible substitutions for 
log2n steps. He has 2 k+l choices at the first step, 23k+2 at the second 
step, . . . ,  2 (2`-l)k+2(t-1) choices at the tth step. So, he has 2 (n-1)k+20°g2n-l) > 2 ~n-1)k 
choices at the step log2n. He may still be working on it if n is big. He will never 
try again if n is small. 
5. The plaintext blocksize 
In many instances the eneryption method determines an optimal blocksize for 
the division of the plaintext into blocks. In general it is not to be expected that all 
plaintexts would be encrypted as a single string of symbols. The plaintext is rather 
divided into blocks that are encrypted separately. 
For instance, in case of RSA, the size of the plaintext blocks is determined by 
the number of bits in the modulus. 
In our case the division of the plaintext into blocks is quite arbitrary and need 
not be agreed upon in advance. For instance, the plaintext 0010111101011 can be 
divided into three blocks 
001, 01111010 and 11 
that are encrypted separately tocryptotexts cl, c2 and c3. The latter are then separated 
by the boundary marker #.  Thus, the resulting cryptotext is cl # c2# c3. The 
decryption (as well as the cryptanalysis) of the ci can be accomplished individually, 
that is, independently of the other c's. 
It is clear that a rapid growth rate in the publicized T0L system requires arelatively 
small blocksize. On the other hand, the latter is likely to make cryptanalysis easier. 
One has to decide upon a suitable compromise between these two, in some sense 
contradictory, requirements. 
The use of the boundary marker # certainly weakens the system. One can get 
rid of it, and we hope to return to this matter in a forthcoming contribution. For 
instance, we can publicize the total number k of plaintext blocks. After receiving 
the cryptotext, a legal recipient first transforms it to a text of the secret DTOL system, 
after which he or she divides it in all possible ways into k blocks. This can certainly 
be done in polynomial time. In the correct division, each block 'yields backwards' 
the axiom of the DTOL system. 
6. The role of dummy symbols 
It is an understatement that dummy symbols double or triple the complexity of 
cryptanalysis. In fact, they are very essential to any cryptosystem of this type. 
Without them, such a cryptosystem would be easily broken. In the following, we 
A public-key cryptosystem 293 
will show how to break such a cryptosystem that is known to be free of dummy 
symbols. 
Let H = (A, O'o, cx, u) be a public T0L system constructed from a DTOL system 
G = (,Y, ho, h~, w) and g:A*--> ~* be the trapdoor morphism. We know H and also 
the fact that g is e-free. We define an equivalence r lation --- as follows: 
(1) a-a ,  for any a~A;  
(2) if a - -b  and hi(a)= axa2.., at, h i (b) -b~b2. . ,  bt for some i= 0 or 1, then 
a j -  bj for j=  l ,2 , . . . ,  t. 
Denote by E the set of all equivalence classes of the relation --. Let [a] be the 
equivalence class determined by a ~ A. Now, we define a mapping f :  A-> E such 
that f (a )= [a] for any a ~ A. The mapping f is extended to a morphism in the 
natural fashion. By applying f, we construct a T0L system H'= (E, 80, ~5~, v) such 
that v =f(u)  and 8i([a]) = { f (a ) la  ~ ~ri(a)}, for i = 0, 1. It is easy to see that the 
substitutions 8o and 8~ are actually morphisms, and H' is a DTOL system. H' 
preserves H's property of backward eterminism. In order to decrypt a cryptotext 
x, we simply decrypt f (x )  according to H'. The decrypted text for f (x )  is actually 
the plaintext for x. It is not difficult to see that the decryption of a cryptotext of 
length n according to H'  by the brute force approach is of time complexity linear 
with respect o n. 
We can even go further to reduce the size of H'  by extending the definition of 
the relation -ffi as follows: 
(3) if ho(a) = a~a2.., as, ho(b) = b~b2.., bs, ai - bi for i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  s, and h~(a) = 
c~c2.., ct, hi(b) = d~d2.., dr, c i -  di for i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  t, then a -= b. 
However, when dummy symbols are applied, the order of the letters on the 
right-hand side of a substitution is disturbed by dummy symbols. It is no longer 
easy to find the equivalence classes of the relation --. In this sense, the complexity 
of breaking such a cryptosystem highly depends on the complexity of finding all 
the dummy symbols of the system. 
7. The role of growth 
The public-key cryptosystem we are investigating is a functional cryptosystem. 
Functional cryptosystems can be characterized asfollows. 
We begin with two functions eo and el and an initial value x. The functions can 
be word functions (that is, the domain and range is the set of words over some 
alphabet); then, x is a word. They can also be numerical functions, and so forth. 
In our considerations above, the functions were the morphisms ho and hi, and the 
initial value the start word w. 
A functional cryptosystem is transformed to a public-key system by hiding the 
triple (x, eo, el) inside a triple (Y, fo,f~) that is 'bigger' and in some sense harder to 
parse. Above, the new triple was defined by a T0L system. In the transformation 
the original functions may become (as was the case above) one-to-many relations. 
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A feature desirable for all cryptosystems is that the cryptotext should not be much 
longer than the corresponding plaintext. Length considerations are especially impor- 
tant for functional cryptosystems because one application of a function (which 
corresponds to one bit in the plaintext) may considerably increase the length of the 
cryptotext. 
Because of the flexibility of the blocksize of plaintexts, length considerations are 
not of such crucial importance in our case as, for instance, for other language- 
theoretic systems [11, 12]. In case of rapid growth we can choose a smaller block-size. 
However, rapid growth can also be avoided by designing the system carefully, taking 
into account he well-known theory of DTOL growth functions [6]. In fact, aspects 
of this theory needed for cryptosystems have been developed in [4]. Here only some 
basic issues are presented. 
For a DTOL system G = (2~, h i , . . . ,  h~, w), the average growth function f~ is 
defined by 
fc(n)= k-" ~. J(w)HI, 
H 
where H ranges over all words of length n over the alphabet {h i , . . . ,  hk}. 
Thus, f~(n) indicates the average length of words obtained by derivations of 
length n according to G. A word obtained several times is counted as many times 
as it occurs. We are considering eneral DTOL systems with k (rather than just 2) 
morphisms. 
Assume that the alphabet £ has t letters. We associate with the system G altogether 
k t-dimensional square matrices MI, . . . ,  Mk, namely the growth matrices of the 
morphisms hi, a t-dimensional row vector 7r~, namely the Parikh vector of w, and 
a t-dimensional column vector ~a consisting entirely of l's. For instance, for the 
system G discussed at the end of Section 2, we have 
We denote by M the average of the matrices M~,.. . ,  Mk, that is, the t-dimensional 
square matrix whose every entry equals the average of the corresponding entries in 
the matrices Mi. Clearly, the entries of M are rational numbers with denominators 
~ k. In our example 
Theorem 7.1. The average growth function of a DTOL system G can be written in the 
form fo(n) = ~c,M"~o. 
Proof. We claim that the average number of occurrences of each particular letter 
after an n-step derivation is given by the vector ~rc, M". From this claim the theorem 
immediately follows. 
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The claim trivially holds true for n = 0. Assuming inductively that it holds for a 
particular value n, we observe that the average number of occurrences of each 
particular letter after an (n + 1)-step derivation is indicated by the vector 
V=~ i=l 
However, v can be written in the form 
v=(rr~ Mn) E Mi = • 
i=l 
Hence, our claim holds for the value n + 1, which proves the theorem. [] 
The following theorem is now an immediate corollary. 
Theorem 7.2. Average growth functions of DTOL systems are Q+-rationaL For every 
DTOL system G with k morphisms, there is a DOL system H such that the average 
growth function f~ of G can be expressed in terms of the growth function fn of H as 
follows: fa(n)= k-nfn(n). 
We finally mention that detailed results concerning the growth properties of DTOL 
systems with only very few morphisms and letters in the alphabet have been presented 
in [4]. A rather surprising result statistically is that most of the systems were suitable 
basic systems for our eryptosystems: the average growth was rather slow. 
8. Conclusion 
We have investigated the cryptosystem based on iterated morphisms and substitu- 
tions from many points of view. Several other studies are in existence. The results 
are promising in the sense that eryptanalysis seems to be very difficult and the system 
seems to work in a proper way also with respect o eneryption, deeryption, word 
length, etc. 
A very important issue concerning public-key cryptosystems is eryptanalysis by 
preproeessing. After the publication of the eneryption key, there is usually plenty 
of time before important messages start arriving. This time is 'free' for the cryp- 
tanalyst. He or she might find the proper deeryption key just by good luck. 
In our case, this seems to be not possible. A eryptanalyst might find a possible 
decryption key by preproeessing, that is, a DTOL system that might give rise according 
to the rules to the publicized T0L system. However, the eryptanalyst has no way of 
knowing that the found deeryption key is actually the correct one, that is, the one 
actually used by the eryptosystem designer. 
Our system compares favorably with other language-theoretic systems, such as 
the ones presented in [11, 12]. Breaking the system by preprocessing is quite possible 
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for the latter systems. For instance, in case of [12] it suffices to find any extension 
of the publicized set of defining relations that satisfies the requirements: the word 
problem of the resulting group is easy, and the two publicized words are still 
inequivalent. In the other systems there is also no flexibility in the plaintext blocksize, 
and the cryptotext becoming too long constitutes a definite problem. 
More research is still needed both as regards specific issues concerning our system 
and related problems in the theory of L systems. Of the latter we mention the 
following. 
(i) A detailed characterization of classes of 'good' basic DTOL systems. 
(ii) This is connected with (i). The two most important requirements for goodness 
are an easy parsing algorithm and mild average growth. Both of these requirements 
can also be studied independently as properties of DTOL systems. 
(iii) The development of methods for a fast transformation of a DTOL system 
into a T0L system (in the sense described above). 
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